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Abstract
This article presents a strategic, operational, and tactical analysis of
information currently available on the state of bio-weapons development
by non-state actors, primarily Islamist jihadists. It discusses the evidence
supporting a practical assessment that non-state actors have begun to
acquire, and in the near-term intend to employ, bio-weapons. A pathogen
and method of attack specifically designed to achieve the strategic goals
of jihadists are presented as functional examples of the problem of the
emerging global bio-weapons threat.Is a terrorist attack utilizing
biological weapons a real threat? If so, is there a way to predict the
circumstances under which it might happen or how it might be
conducted? This article explores what is known and cannot be known
about these questions, and will examine the threat of biological terrorism
in the context of the strategic goals, operational methods, and tactical
intentions of Islamist terrorists.
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The Tipping Point: Biological 
Terrorism
By Scott Cary
Introduction
This article presents a strategic, operational, and tactical analysis of infor-
mation currently available on the state of bio-weapons development by 
non-state actors, primarily Islamist jihadists. It discusses the evidence 
supporting a practical assessment that non-state actors have begun to 
acquire, and in the near-term intend to employ, bio-weapons. A pathogen 
and method of attack specifically designed to achieve the strategic goals of 
jihadists are presented as functional examples of the problem of the 
emerging global bio-weapons threat.
Is a terrorist attack utilizing biological weapons a real threat? If so, is 
there a way to predict the circumstances under which it might happen or 
how it might be conducted? This article explores what is known and can-
not be known about these questions, and will examine the threat of bio-
logical terrorism in the context of the strategic goals, operational 
methods, and tactical intentions of Islamist terrorists.
Strategic, Political Nature of Terrorist Groups
Any strategic analysis of terrorist weapon capabilities and potential future 
attack should start with the understanding of who the terrorists are and 
how their perceived legitimacy is derived from the tenets of their radical 
religious beliefs. Terrorists, like nation-states, are determined to impose 
their will upon others. Unlike nation-states, however, terrorists resort to 
violence as the first and final solution.
The Basis of the Right to Rule and Asymmetric Warfare
A nation's international decisions are carried out by diplomacy, enforced 
by a military, and directed by a political body as an expression of the 
interests of the people it governs. In cases of international conflict, a 
nation's standing military force executes international policy decisions. 
Such actions are openly recognized by sovereign nations as part of inter-
national norm de jure due, in large part, to the uniform practice of war 
throughout history. Prescribed force, within the bounds of just war, is the 
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means by which legitimate nation-states periodically resolve their differ-
ences to, somewhat paradoxically, continue to survive in a world that 
requires order and the rule of law to maintain long-term peace and stabil-
ity. In a less than perfect world, however, legitimacy is sometimes 
obtained by other means.
One measure of legitimacy is the degree of support that leaders have and 
how they obtained that support. Legitimacy can be won by the leaders of a 
country who hold the confidence of its people obtained through elections. 
Nation-states that attempt to acquire legitimacy through blunt force are, 
on the other hand, rejected by the international community. We may take 
strong objection to the grounds upon which such authority or self-
imposed "legitimacy" rests, but we ignore these leaders and nations at our 
peril. This is the kind of so-called legitimacy that is sought by totalitarian 
regimes and terrorist groups worldwide.
Unlike nation-states, terrorist groups are not recognized as legitimate and 
independent sovereign forces; they do not represent the political will of 
the citizens of any country, and they do not have the ability to employ col-
lective military might against their opponents. Nevertheless, their actions 
are political in nature, both because their actions are a direct manifesta-
tion of their culture, economics, and belief system, and because they are 
aimed at creating the same sort of changes at which legitimate military 
actions are aimed—imposing their political will upon an outside group of 
people. They seek to attain legitimacy through the threat or act of 
large-scale violence, and thereby achieve the ability to impose their values 
upon our country and other countries.
Jihad
Islamist extremists who regularly employ violence to achieve their ends 
describe themselves as fulfilling a religious duty to combat non-Muslims 
and, particularly, to combat those who do not adhere to their radical 
interpretation of Islam. Many Islamists are granted recognition, support, 
and in some cases legitimacy, even if those actors use violence in a way 
that non-Muslims and Muslims alike would label "terrorism."
Despite the fact that the term jihad has several levels of meaning, ranging 
from intense concentration on self-improvement to advancement of the 
faith through writing, Islamist extremists invariably select its most 
extreme interpretation—the conversion or death of non-believers and 
even moderate factions within Islam.
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The first jihad began circa 622 CE, when the founder of Islam, Moham-
mad, first coined the term and actively engaged in it. Because Muhammad 
is considered by Muslims to be the perfect human example, everything he 
did in his life is likewise considered worthy of emulation by all Muslims 
for all time. Therefore, many extremist Islamists find it difficult to refute 
that jihad is simply a socially acceptable justification for violence.
In the end, jihadist terrorist groups seek at least these two things:
1.  Recognition that they are a potent, independent force
2. The ability to influence world events and impose their way of life on 
others
Why Jihadists Would Choose WMD
It is for the above reasons that Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
appeal to Islamist extremists. It is a generally accepted principle among 
Western analysts that terrorists are less concerned with the number of 
people killed in an attack and the destructive power of WMD than they 
are about the number of witnesses and survivors "terrorized" by the 
attack.1 It is for the sake of its effect on "human behavior, media coverage, 
and psychosocial"2 functioning of the public, as well as its effect on the 
leaders elected by that public, that they commit atrocities such as tele-
vised beheadings and indiscriminate marketplace bombings. The table 
below lists some of the prominent psychological effects that would likely 
surface in the aftermath of a biological terrorism incident.
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From "The Threat of Biological weapons: Prophylaxis and Mitigation of Psycho-
logical and Social Consequences."3
Biological weapons are unequalled in their capacity to visit terror on the 
public at large and at overwhelming the social structures and systems in 
place that serve the public. Widespread research on this subject is ongo-
ing, and several academic sources have described the probable effect of a 
biological attack on the general populace:
An incident with these weapons will be unlike any other disas-
ter…a biological incident poses a sudden, unanticipated, and 
unfamiliar threat to health that lacks sensory cues, is prolonged 
or recurrent, perhaps is contagious, and produces casualties 
that are observed by others. These are the factors that, histori-
cally, have spawned fear, panic, and contagious somatization.4
The bottom line, and most analysts will probably agree, is that terrorist 
groups will strike whenever they have motive, capability, and opportunity.
Table 1: Psychological Responses Following a Biological Terrorist 
Attack
Horror
Anger
Panic
Magical thinking about microbes and viruses
Fear of invisible agents
Fear of contagion
Anger at terrorists, government, or both
Attribution of arousal symptoms to infection
Scapegoating
Paranoia
Social isolation
Demoralization
Loss of faith in social institutions
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Accessibility of Bio-Weapons to Terrorists
Because the use of biological weapons contributes to the very definition of 
terror, one must consider whether such weapons are available to jihadists 
as an attack option. Although the United States has already implemented 
world-class anti-proliferation efforts and expended billions in 
counter-terrorism and regional preparedness funding, it is difficult to 
detect the development of biological weapons capabilities by non-state 
actors, or even nation-states for that matter.
There are three main components to the development of most biological 
weapons: scientific expertise, pathogens and growth medium, and equip-
ment. According to biological weapons expert Dr. Reynold Salerno of San-
dia National Labs, "There's no good way to track or control expertise. 
There are few, if any, pieces of technology used to make bio-weapons that 
are not also used for some other legitimate purpose. There are a lot of 
pathogens naturally occurring and widely available for weaponization."5
By and large, biological weapons are getting easier to develop by individu-
als and non-state actors, either by indigenous manufacture, or acquisition 
and theft from any nation-state that has developed them. There is also the 
possibility of collecting pathogen samples from vectors that carry the 
infection during a naturally occurring outbreak. In 2006 and 2007, the 
U.S. State Department listed five legitimate nation-states that are known 
to openly support terrorist groups.6 Four of them—Cuba, Iran, North 
Korea, and Syria—have established their own biological weapons pro-
grams, in addition to the known bio-weapons programs of the U.S., 
China, Egypt, Israel, Taiwan, and Russia.7 There is evidence that some 
nation-states may be willing to assist non-state actors in their pursuit of 
this dangerous capability.
Equipment with which to develop biological weapons is now relatively 
easy to acquire, and the pathogens themselves are relatively common-
place. According to one source, it costs approximately $1.6 million using 
equipment that is commercially available to produce a viable biological 
weapon.8
A facility dedicated to the development of bio-weapons does not require 
much space, nor does it have to be in an isolated location, surrounded by 
barbed wire and biohazard signs, as one might expect to find in a 
state-run program. The U.S. Government and other nations with an active 
interest in monitoring the capabilities of their neighbors collect intelli-
gence on potential bio-weapons facilities. Even so, bio-weapons projects 
could be located in the center of a large civilian population, and no one 
Cary: The Tipping Point: Biological Terrorism
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
Journal of Strategic Security
18
would be the wiser. For example, former USSR bio-weapons facilities 
were often "hidden in plain sight" by using physical deception methods in 
order to change the visual signature of facilities.9 These methods of 
deception allowed the Soviets to misrepresent facilities in photos taken by 
spy planes and later satellites capable of taking detailed pictures of sus-
pected sites. If large, modern state programs can be so easily camouflaged 
from discovery by other nations using advanced imagery technology, con-
sider how easily a much smaller lab built in an old warehouse or process-
ing plant could be concealed, even from civilians residing mere yards 
away.
Relatively speaking, biological weapons are rapidly becoming more acces-
sible and, hence, more feasible to acquire and potentially use than many 
other forms of WMD. According to Howitt and Pangi, "Biological weap-
ons, cheaper and easier to produce than nuclear weapons and more lethal 
than chemical weapons, are now perceived as the weapon of choice for 
both state and non-state actors seeking to inflict maximum damage while 
minimizing the risk of detection and retaliation."10 Whereas straightfor-
ward explosive attacks are relatively cheap compared to the damage and 
fear they produce, biological weapons are the next logical step up in attack 
technology. DiGionvanni stated, "…acquisition, delivery, and targeting of 
these weapons are within the grasp of any determined and skilled individ-
ual or group."11
Terrorist Operational Capabilities
Terrorist groups do not openly advertise their capabilities in bio-weapons 
development. For very good reasons, even if information existed on the 
location and capability of a terrorist-run facility for bio-weapons, it's 
unlikely that the information would be available to the public. There are 
very few primary sources of information on the subject of terrorist capa-
bilities with respect to bio-weapons. Nevertheless, there are subtle indica-
tors appearing on the worldwide scene as well. It is impossible to assert 
that such events constitute "proof" in the absence of primary documenta-
tion or more extensive evidence. Regardless, many analysts feel that 
where there is smoke, there must be fire.
For example, in January of 2009, the bodies of at least 40 alleged 
al-Qaeda operatives were discovered in a sealed cave in Algeria. All 40 
victims had died of bubonic plague, which is readily communicable and 
kills within hours. As reported on January 19, 2009, by the Washington 
Times:
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Authorities in the first week of January intercepted an urgent 
communication between the leadership of al Qaeda in the Land 
of the Maghreb (AQIM) and al Qaeda's leadership in the tribal 
region of Pakistan on the border with Afghanistan. The commu-
nication suggested that an area sealed to prevent leakage of a 
biological or chemical substance had been breached.12
There are not many alternative logical explanations for such a discovery, 
aside from the possibility that a secret bio-weapons facility had suffered a 
catastrophic accident. The plausibility of this scenario is even more likely 
when taken in context with al-Qaeda's previous interest in biological 
weapons. A former CIA chief and expert in terrorism has indicated that:
Documents discovered from Al Qaeda facilities in Afghanistan 
show that Bin Laden was pursuing a sophisticated biological 
weapons research program…Manuals and testimony also indi-
cate that Al Qaeda has determined how to operationalize chemi-
cal and biological warfare.13
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) terrorism expert Dr. Jill Bel-
lamy-Dekker is in agreement that Islamist extremist groups have the 
capability to develop and carry out such an attack: "There is good reason 
for the Americans' fears…[al-Qaeda] had laboratories in north Afghani-
stan. They have scientists, chemists and nuclear physicists…People who 
follow such things know that al-Qaeda has laboratories..."14
A little closer to home, in a June 2009 article The Washington Times 
reported that:
U.S. counter-terrorism officials have authenticated a video by 
an al Qaeda recruiter threatening to smuggle a biological 
weapon into the United States via tunnels under the Mexico bor-
der, the latest sign of the terrorist group's determination to 
stage another mass-casualty attack on the U.S. homeland.15
The successful use of a biological weapon on U.S. soil would be considered 
a desirable outcome by Islamist extremists in their pursuit of global jihad. 
The spokesperson for al-Qaeda agrees: "What a horrifying idea; 9/11 will 
be small change in comparison. Am I right?...It will turn into a real cele-
bration."16
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Opportunities for Tactical Application and Targeting
Certain biological agents can be applied via direct contact, and in ways in 
which the victim would be unaware at the time of exposure. For maxi-
mum effect, a biological weapon would be delivered in an aerosol form 
above a large target population. However, to avoid the added technologi-
cal challenge of aerosolization, not to mention the additional problem of 
concealing bulky metallic spray devices, a terrorist could simply opt for a 
liquid solution (or "slurry") that would fit into a small glass vial. There is 
no unattended "suspicious package," nor any obvious sign that an attack 
is taking place at all. Biological weapons delivered this way are easy to 
transport, easy to hide, and are virtually invisible to our current detection 
methods.
Selecting a pathogen such as variola major, also known as smallpox, 
would make it even easier to carry out an attack without fear of detection 
or retaliation. Despite suspenseful plots portrayed by the entertainment 
industry, smallpox spreads rather slowly. On average, each untreated case 
can infect approximately five other people in the two-week symptomatic 
phase.17
Smallpox has a two-week incubation stage during which the victim has no 
real symptoms, followed by a two-week active stage during which the vic-
tim has significant symptoms and is contagious, followed by either death 
or recovery. The normal fatality rate for smallpox is 30%.18 At the 
moment, variola major is only officially held in two repositories: at the 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in the United States and by Russia's 
Vector program.19 Nonetheless, some analysts believe that at least five 
other countries have samples prepared, and that some of those samples 
have been "manipulated" in such a way as to make them more contagious, 
more lethal, or both.20
Due to the long incubation stage, anyone infected with the virus could 
hypothetically travel a great distance before becoming seriously ill, allow-
ing for a broad dispersion to multiple victims. An appropriate tactical tar-
get for such a pathogen would be an indoor location occupied by large 
groups of people who are all in transit to different locations. Grand Cen-
tral Station in New York City, O'Hare airport in Chicago, and L'Enfant 
Plaza in Washington, D.C. all come to mind. Holiday season travel would 
be most advantageous for terrorist planners, as there would be a greater 
likelihood that first-generation victims would be indoors and in close 
proximity to small groups of family when they begin the symptomatic and 
infectious stage two.
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 2, No. 3
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss3/2
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.3.2
The Tipping Point: Biological Terrorism
21
Complex statistical outbreak and treatment scenarios exist,21 but a quick 
estimate of the death toll of an attack with smallpox might look like this:
The death toll in this case would be much smaller than that of 9/11, but it 
would nonetheless be effective in generating terror and in compelling a 
government crisis response. Thousands would be indirectly affected, hos-
pitals and medical systems would be overwhelmed with the "worried well" 
(those who go to the hospital thinking they are infected when, in fact, they 
are not), and billions of dollars would be potentially lost in containing the 
event, and in absorbing the surrounding political and economic fallout.
Conclusion
The possibility of a terrorist attack utilizing biological weapons is an 
extremely relevant and valid concern. Islamist jihadist strategy demands 
the infliction of terror and death on non-believers. While it is difficult to 
provide irrefutable evidence, all signs indicate that they either have the 
capability or will in the near future. There is no way to reliably predict 
Table 2: Death Toll of an Intentional Smallpox Outbreak
Scenario Infected Fatalities
3 attack sites, 100 people 
infected at each site before 
discovery of the first case.
300 0
300 infected people infect 
approximately 1500 more 
before CDC and medical 
community can react.
30% of original cases are 
fatal.
1800 – 90 fatalities = 1710 90
CDC isolates and success-
fully treats 75% of active 
cases. 30% fatality for 
untreated cases.
1710 x 0.25 = 427 427 x 0.30 = 128
CDC locates and success-
fully treats remainder of 
cases.
 299 0
Outbreak contained. 0 218
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when such an attack might occur, but the conditions under which it might 
occur are coalescing into an increasing probability of attack.
Islamist terrorist groups, like the one represented by Usama bin Ladin, 
clearly intend to carry out whatever form of attack has the greatest impact 
on the people and policies of the United States. If they succeed, they will 
gain additional legitimacy in the eyes of other world leaders. We may con-
demn the violence perpetrated by such groups on non-combatants, and 
we may refute their legitimacy as political bodies, but we ignore at our 
peril the threat they represent.
Strategically speaking, we must find ways to reduce or eliminate the logi-
cal appeal of biological and other forms of terrorism as a means to an end, 
either by deterring, discovering, or destroying such efforts or by institut-
ing sufficient homeland protective measures. Perhaps more importantly, 
we must discover what factors contribute to the global movement of 
Islamist jihad and find ways to minimize or eliminate those factors as sig-
nificant motivators, in order to slow down and then overcome the 
momentum of the movement itself. The most important of these factors is 
undeniably the utility of violence in obtaining legitimacy-by-force.
With many thanks to Jill Dekker-Bellamy for guidance and mentoring, 
and to Clare Lopez, Vice President of The Intelligence Summit, for 
remarkable insight into Islamist culture.
About the Author
Scott Cary is a distance-learning student at the U.S. Naval War College, 
currently enrolled in two courses: Joint Maritime Operations, and 
Counter-Terrorism. He holds two Master's degrees: an MA in Psychology 
from Northwestern University, and an MBA from Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity. He is currently employed with the City of Washington, D.C. Mr. Cary 
can be reached for comment at: scott.cary@dc.gov.
References
1   David Alan Alexander and Susan Klein, "Biochemical terrorism: too awful to con-
template, too serious to ignore," British Journal of Psychiatry, 183 (2003): 
491–497.
2   "Human Behavior and WMD Crisis/Risk Communication Workshop," 
Co-sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, and the U.S. Joint Forces Command, March 2001.
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 2, No. 3
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss3/2
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.3.2
The Tipping Point: Biological Terrorism
23
3   Holloway, Norwood, Fullerton, Engel, and Ursano, "The Threat of Biological weap-
ons: Prophylaxis and Mitigation of Psychological and Social Consequences," Jour-
nal of the American Medical Association, 278 no. 5 (August 1997): 425–7.
4   Cleto DiGiovanni, Jr., "Domestic Terrorism With Chemical or Biological Agents: 
Psychiatric Aspects," American Journal of Psychiatry, 156 no. 10 (October 1999).
5   Interview with Reynold Salerno, Ph.D., International Biological Threat Reduction, 
Sandia National Labs, January 8, 2009.
6   U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2006, available at: 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/. 
See also U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2007, available 
at: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/index.htm.
7   Paul K. Kerr, "CRS Report For Congress: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weap-
ons and Missiles: Status and Trends" Congressional Research Services, February 
20, 2008, available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL30699.pdf.
8   GD Koblentz, "Biological Terrorism: Understanding the Threat and America's 
Response," in Countering Terrorism: Dimensions of Preparedness, eds. Howitt 
and Pangi (Cambridge Massachusetts, The MIT Press, 2003).
9   James S. Jaehnig, "Why The United States Underestimated the Soviet BW Threat," 
(Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 2006), available at: 
http://tinyurl.com/nx2yjm (www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTR-
Doc?AD=ADA457274&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf).
10   Arnold M. Howitt and Robyn L. Pangi, "Countering terrorism: Dimensions of Pre-
paredness," (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, 2003).
11   DiGiovanni, (1999).
12   Eli Lake, "Al Qaeda bungles arms experiment," The Washington Times, January 
19, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/6st4yk (www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2009/jan/19/al-qaeda-bungles-arms-experiment/).
13   Vincent M. Cannistraro, "Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction," available 
at: http://tinyurl.com/kjzh5k (www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/col-
loques/20021212/20021212-1.doc).
14   Jerry Gordon, "Al Qaeda Bio-Weapon threat to America," The Iconoclast, June 3, 
2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/mnr9xz (www.newenglishreview.org/
blog_display.cfm/blog_id/21244#CurDomainURL#/blog.cfm).
15   Sara Carter, "Al Qaeda Eyes Bio Attack From Mexico," The Washington Times, 
June 3, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/pc43t3 (www.washington-
times.com/news/2009/jun/03/al-qaeda-eyes-bio-attack-via-mexico-border/).
16   Ibid.
Cary: The Tipping Point: Biological Terrorism
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
Journal of Strategic Security
24
17   "Dark Winter" live tabletop attack scenario produced by University of Pittsburgh 
Medical Center, Center for Biosecurity, June 2001, available at: 
http://tinyurl.com/dn2hs6 (www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/events/
2001_darkwinter/index.html). See also, Center for Infection Disease Research 
and Policy (CIDRAP) website, available at: 
http://tinyurl.com/mfdkk9 (www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/bt/smallpox/
news/smallpoxtrans121701.html), and Raymond Gani and Steve Leach, "Trans-
mission potential of smallpox in contemporary populations," Nature 414 (Decem-
ber 13, 2001): 748–751, available at: 
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v414/n6865/abs/414748a.html.
18   Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Smallpox Disease Overview," Small-
pox Fact Sheet, available at: 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/overview/disease-facts.asp.
19   Richard Black, "Smallpox vaccine to be retained," BBC News, January 11, 2002, 
available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/1756360.stm.
20   See reference #19.
21   Martin I. Meltzer, Inger Damon, James W. LeDuc, and J. Donald Millar, "Modeling 
Potential Responses to Smallpox as a Bioterrorist Weapon," Emerging Infectious 
Diseases, 7, no. 6 (2001), available at: 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no6/meltzer.htm.
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 2, No. 3
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss3/2
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.3.2
